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there's a system called the space fence

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which is unique to the United States and

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we have two locations one in the

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northern one in the southern hemisphere

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where this system operates and

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essentially anything in orbit that

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passes through the beams of this system

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is going to be cataloged in high detail

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and high resolution incredibly powerful

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system in addition we have these

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solid-state phased array Radars that are

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the most powerful emitters on the planet

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Earth

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that are in locations around the

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periphery of North America

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to guard us against ICBM and cruise

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missile attacks and and bomber attacks

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from afar they can see in some cases

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objects potentially uh 20 000 miles away

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the size of a baseball so the taxpayers

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money has been invested uh extensively

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to provide these capabilities they're

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obviously collecting mountains of data

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every day 24 7 365 all year long and

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it's inconceivable that with all of that

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data they're not having any uh any

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incidents involving uh unknown aerial

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phenomenon and in essence look Chris is

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absolutely right

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um we spend billions of dollars on

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avoiding any type of strategic surprise

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from uh from an adversary and so what

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makes our capabilities so capable so

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effective is that we don't just rely on

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one system uh we imagine a uh imagine a

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cloth that has woven fibers uh they kind

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of go this way and then some go up and

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down and that's the strength that that's

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what provides a strength to the fabric

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and very much the same way when we are

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looking at having what we call for

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example

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um air domain awareness being being

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aware of what's actually in our skies we

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have all sorts of very capable systems

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from electro Optical hyperspectral to uh

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electromagnetic like radar and these are

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capabilities that exist not just on the

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ground but also at Sea also airborne and

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finally spaceborne and so when you when

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you have capabilities that are looking

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from the ground up and from the sea up

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and from the air across and from space

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down

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you get a much better comprehensive

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picture of what's going on and and that

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is the value of our of our intelligence

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assets because it's not just one system

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there are multiple systems that are

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designed in some cases some cases to

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work with each other in other cases

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integrating the systems can be a bit of

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a challenge but that therein lies the

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utility

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um as far as the Air Force kind of not

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playing much of a role in this if I may

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remind you and your audience just a few

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months ago the secretary of the Air

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Force said for the record look we know

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these things are out there we know

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they're real these things but since we

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don't know what they are it's not really

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a priority now think about that

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statement for just a minute I'm not

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trying to beat up on on secretary

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Kendall I'm just simply saying that

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that's like saying okay A a submarine

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pops out of the Potomac River outside of

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Washington DC and because we know it's

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not ours but because we don't know whose

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it is yeah we're not going to pay

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attention to it

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um that that really doesn't make much

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sense and especially when you're talking

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about controlled U.S airspace you know

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there are definitely some no-go fly

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zones that we have and we have them

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there too because of a result of of 9

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11. and so making sure that we can

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maintain error domain awareness is an

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imperative of this country good or for

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bad and yet we know as a matter of fact

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these things continue to to come in

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unimpeded into our controlled U.S

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airspace

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um and and they're displaying technology

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quite frankly that is rather perplexing

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it it's beyond anything that we have in

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our current inventory yeah to uh

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exemplify what Lou's talking about the

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U.S space surveillance system alone has

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29 distinct components in subsystems so

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you've got a ground-based optical

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Network that streams the world that's

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looking at the sky and comparing the

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movement against the stars of any

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anything that is reflecting light from

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the sun for example and then imagine 28

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other components including satellite

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systems and ground-based Radars and

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other things so it is quite an extensive

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mesh as Lou said but part of the reason

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that uh in addition to that that it

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seems so

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uh unconscionable to me that the Air

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Force was not um presenting or sharing

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any cases is some of this stuff is in

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the newspapers

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we've got Air Force interceptors taking

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off from from fighter squadrons in

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Oregon Chasing UFOs that commercial

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airline pilots are reporting to the FAA

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and the faa's got them on radar and

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we've got the the chatter from the

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pilots on radar the Air Force is

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acknowledging these planes were

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scrambled so how could they not list and

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identify those as is this is UAP

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incidents

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um so it rages not only from things that

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may be highly classified but things that

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are already very much in the public

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domain and it's very hard for me to

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understand and reconcile the congress's

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request for information and this seeming

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uh near complete dearth of information